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 The Last Chapter? 
Steven D. Smith 
In November 2011, Stanford law professor (and former federal judge) 
Michael McConnell debated Harvard law professor Noah Feldman at 
Georgetown University on the topic “What’s So Special about Religious 
Freedom?”1  McConnell reminded the audience that the First Amendment 
singles out religion for special protection, and he argued that this treatment 
continues to be appropriate today.  For his part, Feldman conceded the first 
half of McConnell’s argument: the First Amendment provides, and framers 
like Madison supposed, that religious freedom is deserving of special 
protection.  But that supposition is no longer justified, Feldman argued.  The 
Constitution’s special treatment of religion was based on historical 
conditions and theological commitments that happened to prevail at the 
founding.  But conditions are different now, and in a modern liberal state it 
is unacceptable for government to act on theological rationales. 
Feldman’s position did not appear to be driven by any animosity toward 
religion.  Nor is any such animosity evident in his other work.2  Religious 
belief and expression should still be protected under other constitutional 
provisions, he insisted, such as freedom of speech.  But there is no longer 
any warrant for singling out religious freedom as a special constitutional 
commitment. 
Ordinary citizens might suppose that Feldman’s position was radical, 
perhaps calculated to provoke (as academic positions sometimes are).  Is it 
really plausible that we would repudiate what many have long regarded as 
“the first freedom”– one that, by Feldman’s own admission the framers 
favored and gave pride of place in the Bill of Rights?  Far from being 
audacious, though, in an academic environment Feldman’s argument might 
 
Credit Line: “The Last Chapter?” reprinted by permission of the publisher from THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM by Steven D. Smith, pp.139–166, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2014 by the President and Fellows of Harvard 
College. 
 1.  The debate can be viewed at http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/rfp/events/what-s-so-
special-about-religious-freedom 
 2.  See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD (2005). 
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more accurately be characterized as ho-hum.  In recent years scholars and 
theorists have increasingly gravitated to this conclusion in one form or 
another.3  A few of these scholars are pretty plainly disdainful of religion,4 
but others (including Feldman) are not; indeed, some think they are acting 
and arguing in the interest of religion.5 
Thus Douglas Laycock, himself a leading scholar and litigator of 
religious freedom, reports that “scholars from all points on the spectrum now 
question whether there is any modern justification for religious liberty.”6  
Nor is it only academics who are skeptical of special protection for religious 
freedom.  The Obama Administration’s positions in the much discussed 
“contraception mandate” controversy7 and in the less prominent but (for 
present purposes) more pointed “ministerial exception” case8 strongly 
suggest that the Administration is similarly disinclined to favor special legal 
protection for religion.  In general, the administration argued in the 
ministerial exception case, churches and religious associations should enjoy 
the same freedom of association that nonreligious associations have—no 
less, but also no more.  There should be no special constitutional protection 
covering the right of churches to select ministers according to their own 
faith-based criteria and judgments.  (We will look more closely at the 
“ministerial exception” case in due course.)  
Professor Laycock, himself a vigorous proponent of religious liberty, 
 
 3.  Some explicitly question the justification for any special protection for religion.  See, e.g., 
Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012); 
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2007); Anthony Ellis, What is Special about Religion?, 25 LAW & PHIL. 219 
(2006); and James W. Nickel, Who Needs Freedom of Religion?, 76 COLO. L. REV. 941, 943 (2005).  
Others argue, in general or with respect to specific issues, for reinterpreting religious freedom to 
include nonreligious interests and beliefs, and thus to deny any distinctive protection to religion or 
religious beliefs.  In this vein, see Scott M. Noveck, The Promise and Problems of Treating 
Religious Freedom as Freedom of Association, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 745 (2010); Kathleen A. Brady, 
Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
1633. 
 4.  See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012). 
 5.  See, e.g., JOHN D. INAZU, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY WITHOUT RELIGION; AND BRADY, RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS. 
 6.  Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 DETROIT-MERCY L. 
REV. 407, 423 (2011). 
 7.  For an essay proposing that arguments defending application of the mandate to objecting 
religious employers are best understood as arguments against giving special protection to religious 
freedom, see Steven D. Smith, The Hard and Easy Case of the Contraception Mandate, U. PA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 261 (2013). 
 8.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
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worries that “[f]or the first time in nearly 300 years, important forces in 
American society are questioning the free exercise of religion in principle– 
suggesting that free exercise of religion may be a bad idea, or at least, a right 
to be minimized.”9  Once again, though, the argument usually is not that 
religion or religious freedom should be suppressed– as they were in, say, the 
Soviet Union, or in the Mexico depicted in Graham Greene’s The Power and 
the Glory—but only that there is no justification for singling out freedom of 
religion for special recognition.  Think of it this way: In the American 
constitutional tradition, we sometimes talk generically about “freedom” or 
“liberty”—and this generic liberty receives minimal constitutional 
protection—but we also have a list of particular and especially cherished 
freedoms that enjoy special judicial and political solicitude: freedom of 
speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly,10 and so forth.  
Traditionally, freedom of religion has been on that list—even at the top of 
the list.  Challenging this tradition, Feldman and like-minded thinkers want 
to take freedom of religion off the VIP list, so to speak, while allowing that 
religious people and groups should receive the same protection that others 
receive under the other freedoms. 
If this proposal comes to be accepted, the outcome would be in one 
sense the last chapter of the story of American religious freedom.  The story 
would then tell how, building on themes that had developed over the past 
two millennia, founding-era Americans conceived of religious freedom as 
deserving of respect and legal protection, how this commitment informed 
commitments to other rights, such as freedom of speech, and how those 
other rights eventually displaced the ancestral commitment to freedom of 
religion.  It is not self-evident that this denouement would be tragic: after all, 
ancestors are pretty much progenitors who are remembered, even revered,  
but who are not around anymore.  So it would be in this case.  Religious 
freedom RIP. 
And yet there are those, like McConnell and Laycock (and also—full 
disclosure—myself) who are not enthused about ending the story now or in 
this way, and who would view such an ending as premature and deeply 
unfortunate.  Those who are not ready for the story to end seemingly include 
(for now, in alternate terms anyway) the Justices of the Supreme Court.  
 
 9.  Laycock, supra note 6, at 407. 
 10.  But see JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 
(2012)  (arguing that freedom of assembly has been devalued in modern constitutional 
jurisprudence). 
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Thus the Court rejected the Obama Administration’s Feldman-like position 
in the ministerial exception case11—and not in a 5-4 conservative/liberal 
split, but unanimously, and emphatically.  So it seems the story is not 
necessarily winding down. 
And indeed, one might ask: If the founders favored a special 
commitment to religious freedom, expressly writing it into the Constitution, 
and if many Americans still favor that position, why amend constitutional 
jurisprudence to strike freedom of religion from the list of specially 
preferred liberties?  It is a formidable question, I think, and it will reappear 
from time to time in this chapter.  But it is also a real question, not a 
rhetorical one: it is not a question calculated to intimidate opponents (like 
Feldman) into embarrassed submission.  On the contrary. 
So in this chapter we will look at two large-scale historic developments 
that have combined to make religious freedom a vulnerable constitutional 
commitment.  Edward Gibbon famously argued that the Roman Empire fell 
as a result of one internal development (the rise of Christianity) and one 
more external development (the incursions of the so-called “barbarians”).  In 
an analogous way, the regime of religious freedom is currently in jeopardy 
through the convergence of one development that is partly internal to the 
tradition of religious freedom and a different development that is mostly 
independent of that tradition.  The internal development is the erosion of the 
rationales for religious freedom by a secularism that, ironically, can be seen 
as an implication or at least an offshoot of religious freedom itself.  The 
mostly independent development is the impressive advance of a formidable 
political and cultural movement that marches under the banner of “equality” 
and that bids to become a new national orthodoxy with features reminiscent 
of those that characterized state-supported orthodoxies during the centuries 
of Christendom. 
 
Religious Inversion, Secular Subversion 
 
The undermining of the justifications for religious freedom has resulted 
from developments already discussed at some length in Chapters 1 and 4.  In 
Chapter 1, we saw how the distinctive components of the American version 
of religious freedom—namely, separation of church and state and freedom 
of conscience—descended from historic Christian commitments.  More 
 
 11.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC,  132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
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specifically, Christianity, in stark contrast to Roman religion and political 
practice, taught that humans are subject to dual legitimate authorities.  We 
should render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and unto God what is God’s.12  
This “render unto” dualism persisted over the centuries in Christian thought: 
thence Augustine’s two cities and, later, Luther’s and Calvin’s two 
kingdoms.  The Christian division of temporal and spiritual jurisdictions 
animated the papal campaign for “freedom of the church”—a remote 
progenitor of American “separation of church and state”—and also, in a 
post-Reformation and more Protestant development, the movement for 
freedom of the “internal church” of conscience. 
These achievements were powerfully reinforced by another Christian 
theme—namely, the emphasis on sincere and voluntary faith as the only path 
to eternal salvation.  This distinctively Christian rationale was powerfully 
deployed by the modern champions of religious toleration and religious 
freedom—Roger Williams, John Locke, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson.  
In conjunction with the dual jurisdictions theme, the voluntary faith rationale 
led to the conclusion that, as Madison put it, religion is “wholly exempt from 
[the state’s] cognizance.”13 
So far so good.  But this Madisonian conclusion produced a potentially 
vitiating paradox.  If religion is wholly outside the state’s cognizance, 
wouldn’t it follow that the state is precluded from acting on religious 
rationales?  So, did religious freedom mean that governments could no 
longer rely on the historic rationales for religious freedom?  Would religious 
freedom cancel itself out by vetoing its own supporting premises? 
The possibility was rendered more probable by another familiar modern 
strand of logic that we considered in Chapter 4 and that goes basically like 
this: religious freedom means that the state must treat people of all religions 
(or none) equally, . . . which in turn entails that the state must remain neutral 
in matters of religion, . . . which in turn entails that the state must remain 
secular, . . . which entails that the state cannot act on or endorse religious 
views or rationales.  We saw in Chapter 4 how this logic of secular neutrality 
has dominated the modern discourse and jurisprudence of religious freedom.  
But again, if the state cannot act on or endorse any religious views, then it 
would seem to follow that the state cannot act on the religious rationales—
 
 12.  Luke 20: 21-26. 
 13.  JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, 
reprinted in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 309, 309 (Daniel L. Dreisbach and Mark David 
Hall eds. 2009). 
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the dual jurisdiction rationale and the voluntary faith rationale—that 
produced the commitment to religious freedom in the first place.  In this 
way, religious freedom turns on and negates its own supporting rationales.14  
It is like the snake that circles around and swallows itself by the tail. 
This self-subverting logic is hardly inexorable, but it is seductive, and 
intriguing to secular thinkers.  Professor Feldman’s position in the 
Georgetown debate may be viewed as the culmination of this logic. 
So, if religious freedom can no longer be justified on the basis of the 
historic rationales that generated the commitment to religious freedom in the 
first place, what follows?  Should we renounce our commitment to religious 
freedom as a specially protected right, as Feldman (along with other scholars 
and, arguably, the Obama Administration) have concluded, leaving religious 
people and groups to fend for themselves on grounds of freedom of speech, 
freedom of association, and the like?  That is one possibility, but hardly the 
only one.  It might be, for example, that even if the historic and religious 
rationales are no longer available, more contemporary and secular rationales 
can step in to do the same work.  At least until recently, this seemed to be 
the assumption of most modern scholars or thinkers who paid any attention 
to the issue15 (or who didn’t pay much attention to the issue). 
Professor Douglas Laycock is a prominent and articulate representative 
of this point of view.  Like Feldman, Laycock acknowledges that as a 
historical matter religious freedom was to a significant extent the product of 
theological rationales;16 also like Feldman, Laycock insists that it would be 
improper for government to rely on such rationales today.17  But Laycock 
thinks that an adequate secular justification can still be offered for giving 
special protection to religious freedom. 
Laycock’s secular case for religious freedom rests on three propositions.  
First, because people care deeply about religion, attempts to impose or 
suppress religion have caused significant suffering and conflict.  Second, 
religious beliefs matter immensely to the believers, sometimes leading them 
to fight, kill, revolt, or suffer martyrdom.  Conversely, and third, religious 
 
 14.  For a more detailed elaboration of this argument, see Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of 
Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 14l9 (1991). 
 15.  See, e.g., 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND 
FAIRNESS 480–96 (2008). 
 16.  DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AS LIBERTY, in 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY 54, 67 (2010). 
 17.  Id. at 58. 
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beliefs are of little importance to civil government.18  From these non-
theological propositions, Laycock believes we can extract a solid 
commitment to religious liberty. 
So, how strong is this defense?  Laycock’s first two propositions, 
basically empirical in nature, would be difficult to dispute.  Attempts to 
suppress religion surely have led to conflict, and suffering: think of the 
attempts in England to suppress Protestantism (under “Bloody Mary”) and 
then Catholicism (under Elizabeth and James I).  And religion plainly is very 
important to some people, who will sometimes take strong or even desperate 
action on the basis of their religious commitments: think of the Maccabean 
insurgents remembered at Hanukkah, or the Catholic conspirators who gave 
us Guy Fawkes Day, or the perpetrators of 9/11.  Both friends and foes of 
religion will likely concede, and even insist on, this point.  
Laycock’s third proposition—that religious beliefs are of little 
importance to government—is more normative, and more contestable.  
Indeed, a critic might suggest that the proposition is blatantly question-
begging: haven’t debates about religious freedom basically reflected 
underlying disagreements precisely about the relevance of religion to 
government?  Still, there is a sense in which the proposition might be 
acceptable to constituencies of both secularist and providentialist 
interpretations of the Republic.  As we saw in Chapter 3, secularists contend 
that government should stay clear of religion; for their part, American 
providentialists have typically insisted that government has no interest in the 
particularities of different religious beliefs.  Remember Eisenhower’s oft 
mocked providentialist statement: “[O]ur form of government has no sense 
unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith [,] and I don’t care what it 
is.”19 
There is surely much that could be debated here; for now, though, let us 
just say that all of Laycock’s propositions, charitably regarded, have a 
decent claim to being at least broadly plausible.  So then is the commitment 
to religious freedom secure after all? 
One objection would assert that Laycock’s rationale is fatally overbroad.  
Even if his contentions are true with respect to religious beliefs, they are not 
true only of religious beliefs: there are other kinds of deeply held or intense 
personal beliefs—philosophical or moral or aesthetic beliefs of various 
 
 18.  Id. at 58–61. 
 19.  Quoted in Paul Horwitz, Religion and American Politics: Three Views of the Cathedral, 39 
U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 973, 978 (2009). 
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kinds, perhaps—about which we could say that their suppression would 
cause suffering and conflict, that the beliefs are of extraordinary importance 
to some people, and that they are or should be of little importance to 
government.  Laycock acknowledges that under his rationale, critics “may 
argue that other strong personal commitments should have been protected as 
well.”20 
Laycock responds to this objection in two ways.  First, he suggests that 
“religion” be defined broadly to include many deeply held beliefs that might 
not conventionally be thought of as religious.21  Even so, he acknowledges 
that his rationale may cover some beliefs that just cannot be considered 
“religion,” and at this point he appeals to constitutional text and history.  We 
protect religion and not other beliefs or concerns to which his secular 
rationale might also extend, he says,  
for the sufficient reason that other strong personal commitments 
have not produced the same history.  The [constitutionally] 
protected liberty is religious liberty, and although the word 
“religion” must be construed in light of continuing developments in 
beliefs about religion, we cannot rewrite the Constitution to say that 
religious liberty should not receive special protection.22 
This is a lawyerly answer, and although it may leave theoretical purists 
feeling a bit queasy, the answer may also be good enough for government 
work.  Laycock is right: the Constitution does refer to “religion” and not to 
“sincere and deeply held beliefs.”  Why isn’t that stark fact enough to settle 
the debate?  Indeed, one might push the point even further and ask, why do 
we need any extratextual rationale at all for religious freedom?  The fact is 
that the Constitution expressly says, in the First Amendment, that religious 
freedom gets special protection.  So if someone (like Professor Feldman) 
asks why religious freedom should be protected, why isn’t “Because the 
Constitution says so” rationale enough?23 
 
 20.  Laycock, supra note 16, at 64. 
 21.  Id. at 74–75. 
 22.  Id. at 64–65. 
 23.  Cf. Laycock, supra note 6, at 430–31 (“I also think we should vigorously enforce free 
exercise simply because it is in the Constitution, and it is a fundamental error to pick and choose 
which constitutional rights we want to enforce.  If we claim the right to enforce only the 
constitutional rights we like, then no constitutional right is safe from shifting public opinion.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
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It is awkward, though, to have no better answer to give than this one for 
at least two reasons.  First, the meaning of constitutional provisions is 
frequently contested: this is conspicuously true of the First Amendment’s 
establishment and free exercise clauses.  And when controversies and 
competing interpretations arise, courts routinely and sensibly attempt to 
construe a law or constitutional provision so as to further its purpose or 
rationale.  If there is no (admissible) rationale, however, or if the proffered 
rationale is overbroad or underinclusive relative to the provision, this 
enterprise of interpretation is frustrated. 
Second, and perhaps even more important, it is not foreordained that 
even constitutional provisions will always remain in force.  They can be 
repealed, as the Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth (on 
prohibition).  Much more commonly, a provision that no longer seems to 
resonate with the live commitments and values of a society is likely to 
become moribund in practice even though, technically, it is still “on the 
books”—or still in the Constitution.  Constitutional provisions rise and fall 
in their importance and their “gravitational force.”24  A provision such as the 
contracts clause25 can loom large in one period (the mid-nineteenth 
century26) and retreat into obscurity in a later period (the twentieth 
century);27 conversely, a provision like the equal protection clause28 can be 
“the last resort of constitutional arguments” (as Justice Holmes quipped)29 
and then somehow mature into one of the main movers and shakers of 
progressive constitutional jurisprudence.  Hence if no cogent (and 
admissible) supporting rationale can be offered for the First Amendment 
religion clauses, they risk declining into relative inertness.  
It is not entirely clear, though, how these general observations apply to 
religious freedom specifically.  After all, it is not as if there is an entire 
absence of justification for protecting religious freedom as such.  The 
classical theological rationales articulated by the likes of Jefferson and 
Madison have not so much been refuted as declared (by some jurists and 
 
 24.  Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 113 (1977) (discussing the 
“gravitational force” of precedents). 
 25.  U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 10 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts.”). 
 26.  See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 75–77 (1993). 
 27.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 602–03 (3d ed. 2009). 
 28.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, sec. 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 29.  Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
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theorists, like Feldman and Laycock) no longer admissible.  But many 
Americans surely still find those rationales persuasive and admissible.  In 
addition, secular rationales for religious freedom are not wanting: the 
problem seems to be that these are typically over- or under-inclusive.  They 
cover more than “religion” and less than everything we think of as 
“religion.”  We have already seen how this is true of Laycock’s three-
proposition rationale; and the same can be said of other familiar secular 
rationales, such as the claims that religion is divisive,30 or that religion is 
central to people’s sense of identity.31  Not everything we call “religion” is 
always divisive—sometimes religion serves rather to unify32—nor is religion 
central to everyone’s self-conception.  Conversely, there are things other 
than religion that can be divisive, or central to some people’s sense of 
identity.33 
So the secular rationales tend to fit awkwardly with the particular 
constitutional commitments manifest in the religion clauses.  Still, those 
rationales do provide reasons, even if imperfectly tailored reasons, in 
support of those commitments. 
It might be that, together with constitutional text and history, these sorts 
of admittedly problematic rationales are solid enough to do the job.  Even so, 
the situation hardly seems stable and secure.  So long as there is no 
significant cost to religious freedom, or no major challenge to it, shaky 
rationales supplementing tradition and text and shored up by political inertia 
might be enough to sustain inherited constitutional commitments.  
Conversely, if a serious challenge arises, the edifice of religious freedom 
might well go the way of the proverbial house built upon the sand when the 
storms came along to batter it.34 
And, as it happens, the storms are already beginning to beat on the 
constitutional edifice. There is currently a serious challenge, or set of 
challenges, to the long-standing commitments to religious freedom.  This 
opposition presents itself under the irreproachable title of “equality.” 
 
 
 30.  Justice Stephen Breyer has sometimes stressed this rationale.  See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 
125 Sup. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  For a critical analysis, see 
Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667 (2006). 
 31.  See, e.g., EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 3, at 124–28 (2007). 
 32.  See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Limits of Secularism: Public Religious Expression in 
Moments of National Crisis and Tragedy, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11 (2002). 
 33.  For elaboration of this point, see Steven D. Smith, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 99–115 (1995). 
 34.  Matt. 7:26–27. 
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The Challenge of Modern Equality 
 
Equality, like religious freedom, is a venerable American ideal.  That 
“all men are created equal” was one of the ostensibly self-evident truths 
invoked to justify the Declaration of Independence from England; in 
Lincoln’s revered Gettysburg formulation, this was “the proposition” to 
which the nation was “dedicated” from the beginning.  Gordon Wood 
explains that “[e]quality was in fact the most radical and most powerful 
ideological force let loose in the Revolution.”35  At the same time, a long line 
of critics and detractors discerned a disturbing measure of inconsistency and 
hypocrisy in the nation’s simultaneous professions of equality and its 
treatment of blacks, Native Americans, women, and minorities of various 
sorts (racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and so forth).  The second half of 
the twentieth century thus witnessed an intensification of efforts to realize 
equality—through judicial decisions, statutes and regulations, and 
education—and also to broaden the scope of what equality is thought to 
entail.  Beginning with religion and race, the campaign for equality 
expanded its efforts to include women, and later—and this seems to be the 
current front line—gays and lesbians. 
The relationship between equality and religious freedom has been 
complicated.  Often the notions have seemed to be intimate allies—identical 
twins, almost.  We have already seen how the most common modern 
conception of religious freedom– one strongly hinted at by Madison and 
ascendant (for better or worse) in modern religion clause jurisprudence– 
understands this freedom in terms of religious equality.36  The state must be 
neutral as among religions, thereby treating them all as equals, and must not 
discriminate among citizens, even in its expressions, on the basis of their 
religion (or lack thereof). 
In addition, the claim is often made that religion provided the 
justification—and still provides the best or even only plausible 
justification—for the proposition that all people are in some sense morally 
equal.  After all, it is hardly obvious (if I may be permitted a gross 
understatement) that humans are of equal worth, moral or otherwise: we 
differ dramatically in our abilities, qualities, and virtues.  Even so,  we are in 
some important sense of equal worth-- so goes the argument-- because we 
 
 35.  GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 232 (1992). 
 36.  For a critical discussion of this development, see Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: 
The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 694–706, 723–30 (2002). 
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are all made “in the image of God” (as the Bible says37) or because we are 
“created equal” (as the Declaration of Independence says) by being 
“endowed by [our] Creator” with inalienable rights or dignity.  Commenting 
on the Declaration’s assertion, Columbia law professor George Fletcher 
explains that “[b]ehind those created equal stands a Creator, who is the 
source of our inalienable rights ‘to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.’”38 Without these religious presuppositions, some argue, 
substantive claims about equality or equal moral worth make little sense.39  
On this view, equality is not only compatible with religion but dependent on 
religion for its plausibility. 
In recent decades, though, the formerly cozy connection between 
equality and religion has become, if not severed, at least severely strained.  
For one thing, modern theorists of equality usually do not invoke religious 
justifications for the claim of “equal worth.”  They may not offer any 
justifications at all, but may instead treat the claim as politically or 
epistemically axiomatic, and hence in no need of extraneous justification.  
Examining the positions of leading theorists including Ronald Dworkin, 
John Rawls, Kai Nielsen, Joel Feinberg, Thomas Nagel, and Alan Gewirth, 
Louis Pojman finds that none of these theorists offers any cogent 
justification for egalitarian commitments; usually the theorists simply assert 
or assume equality, or else posit that in the absence of any persuasive 
objection we should adopt a “presumption” of equal worth.40 
Pojman finds this strategy unsatisfactory.  He conjectures that 
egalitarian commitments are “simply a leftover from a religious world view 
 
 37.  Genesis 1:26–27. 
 38.  George Fletcher, In God’s Image: The Religious Imperative of Equality Under Law, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1608, 1611 (1999). 
 39.  See, e.g., LOUIS POJMAN, ON EQUAL HUMAN WORTH: A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY 
EGALITARIANISM, IN EQUALITY: SELECTED READINGS 282, 295 (Louis P. Pojman and Robert 
Westmoreland eds., 1997).  Jeremy Waldron argues that John Locke’s commitment to equality was 
grounded in religious assumptions, and that modern efforts to support the commitment have to this 
point proven unavailing.  See generally JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY (2002): 
[M]aybe the notion of humans as one another’s equals will begin to fall apart, under 
pressure, without the presence of the religious conception that shaped it. . . .  Locke 
believed this general acceptance [of equality] was impossible apart from the principle’s 
foundation in religious teaching.  We believe otherwise.  Locke, I suspect, would have 
thought we were taking a risk.  And I am afraid it is not entirely clear, given our 
experience of a world and a century in which politics and public reason have cut loose 
from these foundations, that his cautions and suspicions were unjustified. 
Id. at 243. 
 40.  POJMAN, supra note 39, at 283–94. 
[Vol. 41: 903, 2014] The Last Chapter? 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
915 
now rejected by all of the philosophers discussed in this essay,”41 and he 
wonders whether “perhaps we should abandon egalitarianism and devise 
political philosophies that reflect naturalistic assumptions, theories which are 
forthright in viewing humans as differentially talented animals who must get 
on together.”42  But secular liberal theorists seem to draw an opposite 
inference.  If compelling justifications for our commitments to equal worth 
are lacking, the proper inference is not that we should abandon those 
commitments, but rather that the commitments do not need any external 
justification: we should instead accept them as basic and axiomatic (at least 
in a liberal democracy). 
Critics like Pojman may find this assuming away of the question of 
justification intellectually irresponsible.  Irresponsible or not, though, such 
assuming is by now common, and commonly accepted.  Thus, contemporary 
theorists routinely treat equality as axiomatic.  Equality is “a foundational 
value,” Martha Minow and Joseph Singer explain. “It is a fundamental 
principle in our society that all people are . . . entitled to be treated with 
equal concern and respect.”43  Ronald Dworkin agrees: “A political 
community has no moral power to create and enforce obligations against its 
members,” Dworkin declares, “unless it treats them with equal concern and 
respect.”44  Or theorists talk about “equal regard,”45 or “equal citizenship,”46 
or “the equal importance of all human lives.”47 
In this equality-oriented framework, traditional virtues and vices get 
reordered.  Previously “deadly sins” like pride, lust, and sloth are displaced 
on the list of evils by more currently loathsome traits– bigotry and 
intolerance– that are thought to violate the “equal respect” axiom.  
Consequently, a good deal of political polemics (and, for that matter, of 
constitutional jurisprudence48) consists of efforts to show that one’s 
 
 41.  Id. at 283.  
 42.  Id. at 296.  
 43.  Martha Minow & Joseph William Singer, In Praise of Foxes: Pluralism as Fact and Aid to 
the Pursuit of Justice, 90 B.U. L. REV. 903, 905 (2010). 
 44.  RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 330 (2011). 
 45.  See, e.g., EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 3, at 75. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  DWORKIN, supra note 44, at 113. 
 48.  Thus,  citing “a substantial number of Supreme Court decisions, involving a range of legal 
subjects, that condemn public enactments as being expressions of prejudice or irrationality or 
invidiousness,” Robert Nagel shows how “to a remarkable extent our courts have become places 
where the name-calling and exaggeration that mark the lower depths of our political debate are 
simply given a more acceptable, authoritative form.”  Robert F. Nagel, Name-Calling and the Clear 
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opponents are acting from bigotry or prejudice,49 or are failing to accord 
“equal respect” to some disadvantaged but deserving group. 
Equality has moved away from religion not only in its justifications (or 
disavowal thereof, or indifference thereto), but also in the substantive 
content that it is thought to carry.  Theorists usually understand that just in 
itself, the concept of equality has no universal or intrinsic substantive 
content or implications.  Equality surely does not entail the absurd notion 
that all persons, situations, and cases must always be treated in exactly the 
same way, so that if people who can see are permitted to drive, blind people 
must be given the same privilege.  Rather, equality implies that like cases 
(or, as the common phrase goes, “similarly situated” instances or classes) 
should be treated in the same way.  But the substantive criteria for 
determining which cases or classes are relevantly alike or “similarly 
situated” cannot simply be deduced from the abstract concept of equality; 
they must be supplied from other sources.50  For political and legal purposes, 
the substantive content assigned to equality is likely to come from the 
surrounding political culture.  If it is widely supposed that people of 
different races or genders are relevantly different, then equality will not 
require that they be treated in the same way.  Conversely, if we come to 
think that race or sex is irrelevant for legal or political purposes, then our 
commitment to equality will condemn any discrimination on these grounds. 
Professor Laycock suggests that in recent decades, two cultural 
developments have loaded equality with substantive content that often places 
it in conflict with religious freedom.  One has been the increase in the 
number and visibility within American society of non-believers—atheists, 
agnostics, and even people who may have a religious affiliation but little 
actual belief or religious commitment.51  Laycock explains how the more 
active presence of nonbelievers alters perceptions of religious freedom.  
When everyone or nearly everyone was a religious believer of one kind or 
another, religious freedom could be seen as “a sort of mutual non-aggression 
pact” that was beneficial to all.  Today, by contrast, “[m]uch of the 
 
Error Rule, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 193, 199 (1993). 
 49.  For further discussion, see STEVEN D. SMITH, CONCILIATING HATRED, FIRST THINGS 
(June/July 2004). 
 50.  The classic statement in legal literature is Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). 
 51.  For a discussion of the increase in nonbelievers and an argument about the implications of 
this development, see Caroline Mala Corbin, Nonbelievers and Government Speech, 97 IOWA L. 
REV. 347 (2012). 
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nonbelieving minority sees religious liberty as a protection only for 
believers.  On that view, a universal natural right morphs into a special 
interest demand.”52 This development is apparent in the now familiar claim 
that a practice that was once lauded as the fulfillment of religious freedom—
namely, exempting religious believers (such as religious pacifists) from 
some laws that conflict with their faith—is actually a form of illiberal and 
unconstitutional discrimination.53 
The other, probably even more important development, in Laycock’s 
view, has been the growing momentum of the gay rights movement.  
Laycock observes that in 1993 the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
passed with overwhelming support—a unanimous voice vote in the House of 
Representatives and a 97-3 approval in the Senate—but that five years later, 
after this act had been partially invalidated by the Supreme Court,54 the more 
modest Religious Liberty Protection Act provoked such substantial 
opposition that it ultimately failed to pass.  What had happened in the 
interim to produce such different political outcomes?  Speaking not only as a 
scholar but as an active participant in litigation and lobbying, Laycock 
explains that on the basis of several cases in which landlords had refused on 
religious grounds to rent to opposite-sex couples, gay rights groups had 
come to see religious liberty as an obstacle to their objectives.55  He lays 
approximately equal blame on the gay rights movement and on religious 
conservatives who are loath to accept compromises.  But however the 
responsibility is apportioned, the attitudes of opposition have hardened. 
The result of this history is that groups committed to sexual liberty 
naturally view traditional religion as their principal enemy. . . . If 
traditional religion is the enemy, then it might follow that religious 
liberty is a bad thing, because it empowers that enemy.  No one says 
this straight out, at least in public.  But it is a reasonable inference 
from things that are said, both in public and in private.56 
Clashes between the gay rights movement and religious liberty are not 
confined to the United States.  David Novak, a rabbi and scholar at the 
 
 52.  Laycock, supra note 6, at 422. 
 53.  See, e.g., EISGRUBER AND SAGER, supra ntoe 3, at 78-120; William P. Marshall, In Defense 
of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991). 
 54.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 55.  Laycock, supra note 6, at 412–13. 
 56.  Id. at 415. 
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University of Toronto, discusses a case in Ontario—the Marc Hall case—in 
which a male homosexual student successfully sued his Catholic high school 
for discrimination because the school declined to let him bring his boyfriend 
as his date to the senior prom.  Not only did the Catholic school lose the 
case, Novak reports, but the case provoked a good deal of public 
commentary that was hostile—hateful, Novak thinks—toward Catholicism 
because of its commitment to traditional Christian sexual morality.57  In this 
rhetoric Novak discerns an “antireligious agenda that makes Marc Hall a 
pawn in a much larger battle, of which he and his Catholic parents seem to 
be naively unaware.”58  Novak adds that “[t]he threat to religious liberty is 
by no means a uniquely Canadian problem.  Indeed, it is a problem facing 
every religious community in every constitutional democracy.”59 
Gay rights, however, is hardly the only plank in the platform of secular 
egalitarianism that can come into conflict with religious freedom.  Leslie 
Griffin emphasizes the conflicts between religious liberty and the equal 
treatment of women.60  Laura Underkuffler, while conceding that 
“[r]eligious free exercise is important,” argues that it should not be permitted 
to insulate what she calls “odious discrimination”– namely, discrimination 
based on “race, color, religion, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, or 
gender identity.”61  Although equality is a secondary theme in his analysis, 
James Dwyer argues that free exercise accommodation is bad for women 
and children.62 
 
A New Orthodoxy? 
 
Even so, it might seem that these conflicts should be readily negotiable.  
Why not simply pass legislation (or maintain legislation already in place) 
prohibiting discrimination based on sex or sexual orientation, for example, 
or recognizing same-sex marriage, while building in generous exemptions 
for religious objectors?  Centrists like Laycock and Alan Brownstein who 
 
 57.  DAVID NOVAK, IN DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 88–99 (2009). 
 58.  Id. at 99. 
 59.  Id. At 86. 
 60.  Leslie C. Griffin, Smith and Women’s Equality, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1831 (2011). 
 61.  Laura S. Underkuffler, Odious Discrimination and the Religious Exemption Question, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2069, 2090, 2072 (2011). 
 62.  James G. Dwyer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Employment Division v. Smith for 
Family Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781 (2011). 
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favor both religious freedom and gay rights propose such compromises,63 
and they appear not only disappointed but genuinely puzzled when the 
proffered compromises meet with suspicion and opposition from both the 
egalitarian and the religious activists.64 
But the wariness about compromise is hardly surprising, and it is not 
merely a manifestation of arrogance or pigheadedness on the part of 
advocates on each side.  Although centrists may view the more hard-line 
advocates as lamentably shortsighted,65 it may in fact be the advocates who 
are taking the more realistic and long view.  That is because the real conflict 
is not just a set of contingent skirmishes between, on the one hand, a small 
set of specific political proposals and, on the other, some peripheral 
teachings of a few religious faiths.  The conflict is more fundamental than 
that. 
Suppose that religious groups could set aside their specific objection to, 
say, same-sex marriage (as some religious groups can, and do).  Even so, 
more essential conflicts would remain.  Traditional faiths typically teach that 
some people’s deeply held beliefs are true while others are false.  Often they 
will teach that some people are saved and others are not, and that some ways 
of living are acceptable to God while others are abhorrent.  In these ways, 
traditional religion in its very essence will often be a scandal and an offense 
against the whole ethos of contemporary liberal egalitarianism, with its 
commitment to “equal respect” for all persons and all ways of life or 
 
 63.  See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, AFTERWARD, IN SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: 
EMERGING CONFLICTS 89, 90 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds. (2008); and Alan Brownstein, Gays, 
Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious 
Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 64.  See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 63, at 189, 191 (asserting that “[r]eligious minorities and 
sexual minorities could easily be on the same side” and that “[i]t is all very frustrating” that the 
groups cannot seem to cooperate). 
 65.  See also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, A CONSCRIPTED PROPHET’S GUESSES ABOUT THE FUTURE OF 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA, IN 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 445, 452–53 
(2010): 
The leaders of the gay rights movement, and the leaders of the evangelical religious 
movement, both want a total win.  They don’t want to have to litigate over exceptions; 
they don’t want to risk an occasional loss.  It was the gay rights movement that rallied the 
broader civil rights movement to kill the proposed Religious Liberty Protection Act.  
There, religious groups offered far more in search of compromise than gay groups 
offered, but still the religious groups could not pass a bill guaranteeing religious liberty.  
That experience, and experience in state legislatures, leads me to predict with 
considerable confidence that there will be gay rights laws with absurdly narrow religious 
exemptions—perhaps eventually with no exemptions at all—and there will be 
conservative believers who oppose enactment, resist compliance, and seek exemptions. 
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conceptions of “the good.”  To be sure, the traditionally faithful may insist 
that even as they condemn some kinds of conduct as immoral, they respect 
the equal moral worth of people who engage in such conduct– that they 
adhere to the adage to “hate the sin but love the sinner.”  But secular 
egalitarians often find such professions close to incomprehensible,66 and 
hence misguided or disingenuous.  To say that someone’s way of life is 
immoral, they argue, is necessarily to imply that the person is of lesser 
worth, even if the moralist explicitly denies this implication. 
It seems, therefore, that traditional religion and contemporary secular 
egalitarianism are at some deep level fundamentally incompatible.  This 
incompatibility is in some ways reminiscent of the differences we saw in 
Chapter 1 between classical paganism and the emerging Christian 
movement.  Paganism, as we saw, was a this-worldly affair, and it took a 
relaxed attitude toward “truth.”  Christianity, by contrast, aimed for the 
eternal salvation of its adherents, and it linked this salvation to the adherence 
to truth (which was articulated with as much precision as theologians and 
church councils could muster) and to the rejection of error or heresy.  These 
differences were fundamental, and so although pagan rulers alternated 
between persecuting Christians and putting up with them, Christianity could 
never be genuinely assimilated into pagan culture.67  Centuries later, much of 
Christianity—and not only Christianity but what is sometimes called “strong 
religion” generally68—continues to have the features that Christianity 
exhibited in the Roman empire.  Conversely, in its this-worldly emphasis 
and its desire to separate culture and politics from larger questions of truth,69 
modern secular egalitarianism has some of the characteristics of classical 
paganism. 
And yet (and this is a main reason why political compromise is so 
difficult today) in other respects, secular egalitarianism more closely 
 
 66.  See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social 
Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1314 (2011); Michael Kent Curtis, Be Careful What You Wish For: 
Gays, Dueling High School T-shirts, and the Perils of Suppression, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 431, 
484 (2009); Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis? The Proper Methodology When 
Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS J. 685, 720–21 (2008). 
 67.  See Chapter 1, notes 43–74 and accompanying text. 
 68.  GABRIEL A. ALMOND ET AL., STRONG RELIGION: THE RISE OF FUNADMENTALISMS AROUND 
THE WORLD (2003). 
 69.  With reference to the secular liberalism of thinkers like Rawls, Jody Kraus thus explains that 
“[p]olitical liberalism’s preferred strategy is to substitute the idea of reasonableness for truth.”  JODY 
S. KRAUS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND TRUTH, 5 LEGAL THEORY 45, 55 (1999). 
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resembles a secular version of Christendom, under which it was assumed 
that government should act on and impose a favored orthodoxy.  We note 
three similarities. 
First, just as during the centuries from late antiquity through the Peace 
of Westphalia Christianity was thought to be the foundation of the social 
order, contemporary proponents of secular egalitarianism view equality as 
the foundation of our legal and political order.70  True, there is room for 
debate about exactly what secular equality entails or requires (just as there 
were analogous debates within Christendom71).  And secular egalitarianism 
allows for a range of choices and ways of life so long as those choices and 
ways are not incompatible with egalitarianism (Much in the way that 
Christendom supported an “almost riotous diversity”72 of opinions,73 
vocations, and ways of life—so long as they were not fundamentally 
incompatible with Christianity.).  But the basic commitment—to equality or 
equal respect—is not merely one good thing among others (along with 
“domestic tranquility,” economic prosperity, and other goods) that 
government tries to promote.  The commitment is the very basis of political 
legitimacy in our constitutional order. 
Second, just as the proponents of Christian orthodoxies were (and are) 
inordinately certain of their views, the proponents of secular equalities often 
seem serenely untroubled by doubt.  Such serenity may reflect the 
reclassification of equality, noted earlier, from being a proposition in need of 
justification (which, historically, was often religious) to a fundamental 
axiom for which no justification is required. In any case, just as the 
established proponents of Christian doctrines could not imagine that anyone 
could honestly and understandingly disagree, and therefore dismissed 
contrary views as the product of ignorance, willful error, or hypocrisy,74 so 
the committed proponents of, say, same-sex marriage sometimes suggest 
that people who hold the contrary position could only be acting from hatred 
or irrational prejudice, or are in the grip of mindless tradition or religious 
 
 70.  See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 71.  See, e.g., PHILIP JENKINS, JESUS WARS (2011). 
 72.  See BRAD S. GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED REFORMATION 84 (2012) (describing the “almost 
riotous diversity” of beliefs and practices in Christendom on the eve of the Reformation). 
 73.  See ALISTER MCGRATH, THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN REFORMATION 
69–121 (1987) (describing the rich diversity of views in late medieval theology). 
 74.  See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1422 (1990). 
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authority.75  And indeed, that is pretty much what federal judge Vaughn 
Walker concluded in the California Proposition 8 case.76 
Third, and perhaps most portentously, secular egalitarianism is like 
Christianity and Christendom (and unlike classical paganism) in that it is not 
content to regulate outward conduct but instead seeks to penetrate into hearts 
and minds.  After all, secular egalitarians favor “equal concern and respect,” 
and concern and respect are matters not just of external behavior but of 
internal attitudes, intentions, beliefs, and understandings.  Naturally, 
therefore, the proponents of equal respect are concerned with purifying the 
beliefs and motives of government officials, and citizens, and also with 
assuring citizens not merely that they will be justly treated but that they are 
equally respected.  Indeed, the whole purpose of central constitutional 
doctrines today is to avoid “dignitary” or “psychic” harms,77 or to assure 
classes of people that they are not “outsiders” or “lesser members of the 
political community.”78 
In this spirit, in its decision declaring a right to same-sex marriage, the 
California Supreme Court noted that the state had already adopted domestic 
partnership laws that allowed same-sex couples to form unions enjoying 
virtually the same legal privileges and obligations that accompany marriage.  
So the difference between marriages and domestic partnerships had become 
mostly a matter of different labels.  This material equivalency, however, did 
not satisfy the demands of equality and may even have aggravated the 
problem.  That was because, in the court’s view, the essential equivalency in 
the legal features of opposite-sex and same-sex unions made the assignment 
of different labels to those unions all the more conspicuous in conveying a 
sense of lesser respect, and thereby inflicting dignitary harm.79 
From the perspective of this concern for beliefs and motives, a 
governmental act that might be perfectly acceptable if done with a proper 
 
 75.  See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 923, 942 
(2010) (asserting that “[t]he case against same-sex marriage has become increasingly unintelligible, 
which obviously will have implications when courts go looking for a rational basis for laws that 
discriminate against gay people”) (footnotes omitted). 
 76.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 77.  See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 1375, 1443–49 (2010). 
 78.  The assumption animating the no-endorsement doctrine is that if government endorses 
religion, it “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of 
the political community.”  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 79.  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 399–401 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2008).  
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secular purpose is unconstitutional if done with (or if perceived as having) 
an unapproved invidious purpose.80  Similarly, a private act of violence 
performed with an inegalitarian motive—a racist or sexist or homophobic 
motive, for instance—is deemed more reprehensible than the same violent 
and illegal act done intentionally but with a different, less reprehensible 
motive: some such assumption apparently animates laws imposing 
heightened penalties on “hate crimes.”81  And minorities are thought to be 
harmed not just by discriminatory actions, or even by words, but by beliefs.   
Again, Judge Walker’s decision in the California Proposition 8 case provides 
a nice illustration. Walker entered a “finding of fact” declaring that not only 
discriminatory law or conduct but “[r]eligious beliefs that gay and lesbian 
relationships are inferior to heterosexual relationships harm gays and 
lesbians.”  As examples of such harm, Walker quoted a series of Catholic, 
Protestant, and Orthodox teachings on the subject.82 
This conclusion—namely, that a set of religious beliefs in itself 
constitutes a harm to other citizens and a violation of their equality—
ddemonstrates the fundamental conflict between traditional religion and the 
emerging egalitarian orthodoxy.  Devout secularists and perceptive 
religionists alike sense or observe the deep and fundamental conflict 
between contemporary secular egalitarianism and traditional religion.  So it 
is understandable that the proponents of the secular orthodoxies—secular 
proponents of same-sex marriage, for example, or of aggressive 
antidiscrimination legislation and policies—are not eager to accommodate 
religious deviations.83  Why accommodate, and in a sense legitimate, views 
and practices that are archaic and vicious and subversive of the secular 
egalitarian order?  It is likewise understandable that religious believers are 
wary about compromises, described in terms of “exceptions” or 
“exemptions,” that effectively concede the dominant status of a secular 
orthodoxy that is fundamentally hostile to their beliefs and ways of life.  
 
 80.  See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).  Equal protection doctrine 
makes discriminatory purpose decisive for invalidating facially neutral laws.  See, e.g., Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  
 81.  For a careful critical analysis of this proposition, see Heidi M. Jurd & Michael S. Moore, 
Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2004).  
 82.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d, 921, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (Finding 77) 
(emphasis added).  
 83.  See supra notes 63–65, and accompanying text.  See also CHAI R. FELDBLUM, MORAL 
CONFLICT AND CONFLICTING LIBERTIES, IN SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.  
EMERGING CONFLICTS 123 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). 
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Once secular egalitarianism is accepted and entrenched as the prevailing 
orthodoxy, how much sympathy or toleration can they expect over the long 
run to receive from their new and puritanically egalitarian secular masters? 
 
A Negotiable Conflict? 
 
To say that the conflict is irreconcilable is not necessarily to say that 
compromise is impossible.  Indeed, compromise on seemingly 
uncompromisable matters has been an essential component in the American 
political tradition.  Thus in the Philadelphia Convention that drafted the 
Constitution, the so-called Great Compromise negotiated the seemingly 
intractable issue of representation in the national legislature—an issue that 
implicated the fundamental and almost ontological question of whether the 
new government was a union of states or of persons—by creating a 
legislature in which one branch would represent states and the other branch 
would represent the people.  Also in the convention, and for almost three-
quarters of a century afterward, Americans found ways to compromise on 
the issue of slavery.  In retrospect, it is easy to look back with shame (and 
with self-ennobling condescension) on these compromises on a matter as 
fundamental as the enslavement of human beings.  Without such 
compromises, however, the most likely result would not have been the 
liberation of slaves but rather the fragmentation of the Union.84  More 
recently, although presented as an interpretation of the Constitution, the 
dividing up of abortion rights in Roe v. Wade85 into an awkward trimester 
regime is hard to understand except as a judicially-imposed truce on a matter 
as seemingly immune to compromise as the sanctity of life and the moral 
status of the fetus.86 
Moreover, the constitutional system, with its separation of authority into 
a national government and fifty quasi-independent “sovereign” states, seems 
well-designed to facilitate compromise.  On contentious issues, it is possible 
for one position to prevail in one jurisdiction or on one level and for other 
 
 84.  See Sanford Levinson, Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 821 (2011); 
Steven D. Smith, Lessons from Lincoln: A Comment on Levinson, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 915 (2011).  
 85.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 86.  The decision’s attempt at reasoning has been found seriously wanting even by those who 
support the outcome.  See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54 (1988) (describing the Court’s opinion in Roe as “an innovation . . . the 
totally unreasoned judicial opinion”).  
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positions to be adopted in other jurisdictions or on other levels.  And indeed, 
the “American settlement,” discussed in Chapter 3, took advantage of this 
system of federalism and division of jurisdictions to construct what might be 
viewed as a complex, ongoing compromise on the potentially incendiary 
subject of religion.  Under that regime, more providentialist positions could 
prevail at one time or in one jurisdiction; more secularist positions could be 
adopted at other times and in other jurisdictions.  School prayer could be 
(and was) forbidden in one state, permitted in another.  Neither 
providentialist nor secularist interpretations or constituencies were permitted 
to triumph definitively; conversely, both were assured a continuing and 
legitimate place at the constitutional table. 
As we saw in the Chapter 4, however, the modern Supreme Court 
substantially undid the American settlement and reduced the possibilities of 
compromise by expanding the role of judge-enforced hard constitutional law 
in the domain of religion.  As it came to be axiomatic that constitutional 
decisions must be “principled,”87 opportunities for pragmatic compromise 
were reduced.  And the “incorporation” of the religion clauses against the 
states, by mandating that the same constitutional constraints would apply to 
governments state, local, and national, significantly truncated the federalist 
space for reaching different accommodations in accordance with local 
circumstances.88 
Even so, the Supreme Court may have unwittingly preserved, and 
indeed exemplified, the possibility of compromise in a different and less 
appealing way—namely, by being notoriously erratic (or, some might say, 
unprincipled) in its enforcement of ostensible constitutional principles.  The 
inconsistency of the Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence has become 
legendary,89 and critics generally view this erratic quality as something to 
deplore.90  Occasionally, however, commentators take up the theme of the 
 
 87.  The seminal statement is Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
 88.  Several scholars have appreciated this loss and have proposed, in various ways, an 
expansion of that space.  See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 
19 (2006); Mark D. Rosen, The Suprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (2005); and Richard C. Schragger, The Role of Local in the Doctrine and 
Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1888–89 (2004).  
 89.  See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, “Ideology All the Way Down”: An Empirical Study 
of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1244–49 (2012). 
 90.  See, e.g., id. at 1244, 1249–57 (describing the subjectivity of current doctrine and decisions 
as “intolerable” and demanding greater formality and predictability).  
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virtues of incoherence: the fact that the courts come out sometimes on the 
traditional or providentialist side of controversies and sometimes on the 
“progressive” or secularist side means that nobody and no side is losing all 
the time. 
Thus, after noting the inconsistencies in religion clause decisions, 
Phillip Johnson suggested that “the fact that the constitutional doctrine is at 
times muddled and internally inconsistent does not necessarily mean that it 
is intolerable.  On the contrary, the very fact that the holdings do not fit any 
abstract pattern may indicate that the Court is steering a careful path 
between undue preference for religion . . . and undue hostility to it.”91  
William Marshall has argued in a similar vein.  “I do not and cannot argue,” 
Marshall says, “that the Court has embarked on anything remotely 
approaching a consistent course. Yet there may well be a potential benefit 
created by this wavering. Because there have been no clear winners, there 
also have been no clear losers, and it may be that it is the elimination of 
winners and losers that the religion clauses are ultimately about.”92 
It is hard to admire this kind of compromise—namely, one that results 
from flagrant inconsistency in adhering to announced doctrines.93  I 
suggested in the preceding chapter that the Court’s unsteady approach, far 
from pacifying competing constituencies, has left everyone deeply unhappy: 
adherents of the providentialist interpretation are resentful because their 
view has been officially declared heretical (and also, of course, because they 
often lose particular battles), while the secularist side is embittered because 
of what it perceives as a continuing de facto establishment of religion that is 
inconsistent with declared constitutional doctrine.  In the end, though, the 
courts’ inconsistent course has meant that, for better or worse, the conflict 
reflected in the debate between Professors McConnell and Feldman remains 
unsettled.  And recent decisions, in which the Supreme Court has decisively 
straddled the divide, suggest that this irresolution is likely to continue. 
 
The Supreme Court on the Fence 
 
 91.  Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religion Doctrine, 72 
CAL. L. REV. 817, 839 (1984). 
 92.  William P. Marshall, Unprecedential Analysis and Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 925, 929 (1985/1986). 
 93.  I have argued elsewhere that a better way of returning to a “softer” constitutionalism would 
be through tightening up standing requirements, as recent decisions have done (usually arousing the 
ire of constitutional scholars).  See Steven D. Smith, Nonestablishment, Standing, and the Soft 
Constitution, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 407 (2011).  
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Consider how in close succession, the Supreme Court appeared to 
embrace, first, the position favored by Professor Feldman and, not long 
afterward, the position favored by Professor McConnell.  It would be easy to 
become mired in the doctrinal labyrinths that justices and commentators 
attempted to negotiate in these cases.  For our purpose, we will try to avoid 
those lawyerly quagmires and instead observe how the Court first rejected 
and then accepted the basic “religion is special” position. 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez94 arose when Hastings Law School, 
a public law school in San Francisco, denied official recognition to the 
Christian Legal Society (CLS) because the group accepted as members only 
students who could endorse its “Statement of Faith” and who agreed to 
follow prescribed principles, one of which forbade sex outside heterosexual 
marriage.  Because this restriction effectively excluded sexually active 
homosexuals from being members of the society, the law school ruled that 
CLS violated the school’s nondiscrimination policy.  CLS (represented in 
the Supreme Court, as it happened, by Professor McConnell) responded that 
the denial of official recognition, evidently the first of its kind in the 
school’s history, violated the group’s rights of freedom of speech, freedom 
of association, and freedom of religion. 
The controversy presented a host of disputed questions, both factual 
(What was the law school’s policy, exactly?  Was the law school’s decision 
a pretext for excluding a Christian group?) and legal (What sort of “public 
forum” is a public law school?).  For present purposes, the crucial point is 
that the Supreme Court majority treated the case almost entirely under 
current free speech doctrine, according to which the law school’s policy was 
presumptively constitutional as long as it was not intended to suppress the 
expression of ideas on a viewpoint-discriminatory basis.95  Because the 
purpose of the nondiscrimination policy was presumably to prevent 
discrimination, not to suppress views, the Court found no free speech 
violation. 
 
 94.  Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 95.  Martinez was hardly the first case in which the Court treated a controversy over religion as a 
free speech case.  Perhaps ironically, in an earlier important case, Professor McConnell had 
prevailed in obtaining funding for a campus Christian newspaper precisely by arguing that given the 
eligibility of other student publications, the denial of such funding by the University of Virginia was 
an instance of viewpoint discrimination in violation of the free speech clause.  Rosenberger v. 
Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).  Of course, insofar as religion is expressive, there is nothing to prevent 
it from being regarded under both the free speech clause and the religion clauses. 
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But what about freedom of association and freedom of religion—
seemingly the rights most directly implicated?  After all, the Hastings policy 
was not directly about speech at all.  But it did exclude from the law-school 
forum particular kinds of associations—in particular, associations formed on 
the basis of an operative commitment to a familiar kind of religious faith.  
So one might have thought that association and religious freedom would be 
the decision’s dominant themes.  In fact, they barely received any notice in 
the Court’s opinion.  Because the right of “expressive association” has been 
viewed as a corollary of free speech, the Court tersely observed, it would be 
“anomalous” to find a violation of freedom of association where the 
requirements of free speech doctrine were satisfied.96  As for the  exercise of 
religion, the Court relegated its discussion of the issue to a brief footnote 
that merely stated that because the law school’s policy treated student groups 
in the same way, there was no discrimination against religion, and hence no 
free exercise violation.97 
By effectively melting freedom of association and freedom of religion 
into free speech, however, and by interpreting free speech to mean basically 
viewpoint neutrality in application—the Hastings policy was obviously not 
viewpoint neutral in its substance—the Court effectively eliminated 
protection for religious groups against nondiscrimination laws or policies (at 
least in a “limited public forum”).  Focusing on the original Hastings policy 
under which certification had initially been denied,98 Justice Samuel Alito 
pointed out the implications of this approach: 
[T]he policy singled out one category of expressive associations for 
disfavored treatment: groups formed to express a religious message. 
Only religious groups were required to admit students who did not 
share their views. An environmentalist group was not required to 
admit students who rejected global warming. An animal rights 
group was not obligated to accept students who supported the use of 
animals to test cosmetics. But CLS was required to admit avowed 
atheists.99 
 
 96.  Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2975.  
 97.  Id. at 2995 n. 27. 
 98.  In the course of the litigation, Hastings interpreted what on its face appeared to be a standard 
nondiscrimination policy as an “all-comers” policy, such that all groups had to accept all applicants 
for membership (subject to a few constraints of uncertain scope and meaning). 
 99.  Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3010 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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The Martinez decision seemed to evince the Supreme Court’s 
acceptance of the sort of position favored by Professor Feldman: religious 
individuals and associations should enjoy the same protections that others 
enjoy under, for example, the free speech clause, but religion should not be 
singled out for special or differential protection.  Moreover, this ostensibly 
equal treatment meant in reality that religion can be burdened in ways in 
which other sorts of commitments or interests will not be, because a rule 
prohibiting associations from conditioning membership on religious belief 
obviously will have a much more severe impact on churches or other 
religious associations than on other groups.  An HMO or a country club can 
admit, say, Hindus or atheists without in any way altering its essential 
mission: a Christian church that admits Hindus and atheists as full members 
and officers will be compromising its character as a Christian church. 
And yet it would be premature to conclude that Professor Feldman’s “no 
special treatment for religion” position had triumphed decisively.  In the 
following term, the Court unanimously came down in favor of special 
protection for religious institutions in a case called Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC.100 
The case raised the issue of the so-called “ministerial exception”  to 
antidiscrimination laws and labor laws as applied to religious organizations.  
The underlying question presented by the case was basically this: Do 
antidiscrimination laws that forbid most employers to discriminate on the 
basis of sex apply as well to churches, or religious employers, that refuse, 
for example, to ordain women?  Can the Catholic Church, for instance, 
decline to ordain women and thereby exclude women from a whole host of 
clerical positions?  Or, as Richard Garnett puts the question, “[i]f it would be 
illegal for Wal-Mart to fire a store manager because of her gender, then why 
should a religiously affiliated university be permitted to fire a chaplain 
because of hers?”101 
Although federal employment discrimination law expressly allows 
churches to discriminate in favor of hiring members of their own faith,102 not 
all employment laws contain similar exceptions, and even federal law does 
not expressly permit churches to discriminate on grounds other than religion.  
 
 100.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 101.  Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Toward an Institutional Understanding of the 
Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 287 (2008). 
 102.  This exception was upheld against a constitutional challenge in Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
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In particular, the law does not explicitly permit churches to discriminate on 
grounds of sex.  Just on the basis of the law as written, therefore, it would 
appear that a church that does not ordain and hire women for pastoral 
positions—the Catholic church is the most conspicuous example—is in 
violation of federal law, and perhaps of state law as well.  For decades, 
nonetheless, lower courts had ruled that churches have a constitutional right 
to employ otherwise forbidden criteria such as sex in hiring for “ministerial” 
positions.  Litigation over the issue was common, but the typical dispute 
argued not over the existence of this ministerial exception but rather about 
whether a particular position was actually “ministerial.”  (For example, is the 
position of church organist “ministerial”?)103 
Although uniformly accepted in the lower courts, however, the 
ministerial exception was much more controversial in academic discussions.  
Legal scholars pointed out that the constitutional basis of the doctrine was 
uncertain, that the exception fit awkwardly with current free exercise 
doctrine, and that it was in tension with prevailing egalitarian values.104  
Academic proposals to abandon the exception were (and are) common.105  
Surprisingly, none of the cases recognizing the exception had been reviewed 
in the Supreme Court.  In Hosanna-Tabor, that Court finally had an 
opportunity to speak to the issue. 
The case involved a “called” teacher, Cheryl Perich, who had been 
dismissed from a Lutheran school when, after a disagreement about the 
timing of her return to work following a medical leave of absence, Perich 
had hired a lawyer and threatened to sue the school.  (“Called” teachers, as 
opposed to “lay” or “contract” teachers, were appointed by the congregation 
and given the title of “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.”)  The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission then proceeded to file a retaliation 
suit on behalf of Perich under the Americans with Disabilities Act.  The 
Court of Appeals ruled for Perich, concluding that there was little difference 
between what the Lutheran school classified as “called” and “lay” teachers 
and that, despite its title, Perich’s position was not truly ministerial in nature. 
 
 103.  Tomic v. Catholic Diocese, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 104.  See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial 
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007). 
 105.  See id.; and Ian Bartrum, Religion and Race: The Ministerial Exception Reexamined, 106 
NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY. 191 (2011) (arguing that the exception should not shield churches 
against claims of race discrimination).  For a list of articles calling for curtailment of the exception, 
see Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 n.6 (2011).  
As his title suggests, Lund carefully defends the exception. 
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To the surprise of many, rather than focus on defending the position on 
which the Commission had already won in the Court of Appeals (namely, 
that the teacher’s position was not “ministerial” in nature), the Commission, 
represented by the United States Solicitor General, primarily argued for the 
rejection of the ministerial exception altogether.  For the most part, the 
Commission argued, religious employers should be treated like other 
employers.106  So then was the Administration saying that if Wal-Mart 
cannot refuse to hire women as managers, the Catholic Church cannot refuse 
to ordain and employ women as priests?  Not quite—not officially, at least.  
The Commission argued, as the Court put it, that if the Catholic Church or 
an Orthodox Jewish seminary were sued for its refusal to ordain women, 
“religious organizations could successfully defend against employment 
discrimination claims in those circumstances by invoking the constitutional 
right to freedom of association.”107  Given that this same “freedom of 
association” defense had been rejected by the Supreme Court108 when 
asserted by organizations like the Jaycees, however, the Commission’s 
position was puzzling at best.  The bottom line, in any case, was that no 
special protection for religious associations or under the free exercise clause 
was warranted. 
The Supreme Court rejected the Commission’s position; moreover, it 
did so unanimously and emphatically, using terms like “untenable” and 
“remarkable”109 (words that in the understated vocabulary of Supreme Court 
opinions typically mean something like “absurd” or “preposterous”).  
Reciting some of the long history (similar to what we reviewed in Chapter 1) 
of the church’s struggle to achieve independence in its internal affairs from 
state regulation, the Court concluded that constitutional protection for 
church autonomy is not identical to or coextensive with the more generic 
 
 106.  The government acknowledged that religious employers are permitted under federal law to 
discriminate in employment on the basis of religion.  The government also acknowledged that courts 
should avoid deciding religious questions or excessively entangling themselves in religious matters.  
Brief for the Federal Respondent.  
 107.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012). 
 108.  See, e.g., New York State Club Ass. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Board of 
Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).  To be sure, the Boy Scouts had prevailed on a freedom of association 
claim in upholding their right not to employ a gay scoutmaster.  Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 
U.S. 640 (2000).  The relevance of Dale was dubious, however, because the Court had not ruled that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation should prompt “heightened scrutiny” by the courts in the 
way in which discrimination based on race or sex does. 
 109.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church, 132 S. Ct. at 706. 
[Vol. 41: 903, 2014] The Last Chapter? 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
932 
freedom of association enjoyed by nonreligious groups.  This conclusion 
was compelled, the Court thought, by the First Amendment itself, “which 
gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.”110  The 
Court also ruled that the position of a “called” teacher in the Lutheran school 
was ministerial in nature, and hence exempted from the coverage of the 
federal disabilities law.  On its face, Hosanna-Tabor would appear to be a 
resounding victory for the “freedom of the church” and, more generally, for 
the idea that religious freedom is a special right. 
But then of course just a year-and-a-half earlier, in Martinez, the Court 
had appeared to come down on the other side of the “Is religion special?” 
question.  So, are the two decisions simply and flatly inconsistent?  Maybe, 
but it is difficult to say so with confidence, because both cases turned in part 
on doctrinal intricacies (like the amorphous “public forum” doctrine) that 
prevent a simple side-by-side comparison.  And of course future cases will 
likewise turn on such doctrinal intricacies (as well as on others, such as the 
amorphous doctrine of “standing”). 
At this point, consequently, it would be rash to predict with confidence 
that either Hosanna-Tabor or Martinez presages how the Court will come 
down in future cases.  The fundamental debate in which Professors 
McConnell and Feldman skirmished, and in which Americans generally are 
knowingly or unknowingly engaged, looks to continue for some time to 
come. 
 
Freedom of Religion and the Future of the Church 
 
I might conclude this chapter, however, with one tentative and 
conditional prediction: the fate of religious freedom will likely depend to a 
large extent on the fortunes of “the church.”  As we have seen in the course 
of this book, religious freedom has historically been connected, in close if 
complicated ways, to the church.  And this connection is likely to continue.  
So ultimately, if the church continues to be a vigorous and vital institution in 
society, religious freedom will probably be okay.  Conversely, if the church 
declines, religious freedom (and, perhaps, much else) is likely to go down 
with it.  
This may seem to be a gloomy observation, because the church may 
seem to be in poor shape these days.  For one thing, it may seem that “the 
 
 110.  Id. 
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church” (in the singular) doesn’t exist anymore; instead, we have a 
sprawling multiplicity of independent and sometimes mutually antagonistic 
churches and faiths.  For another, some of the major churches have been 
conspicuously afflicted with scandal and internal dissension.  And then 
there’s the increase in the percentage of “nones”– people who on surveys 
indicate no religious belief or affiliation.111  (Numbers can be deceptive, 
though: in one 2011 study, 10 percent of self-professed atheists said they 
pray at least once at week.)112  Adding to these inconveniences is the 
perennial streak of anticlericalism—or suspicion of “organized religion”—
that even religious believers often display.  Richard Garnett observes that 
“[t]oday, churches and their autonomy are often regarded as dangerous 
centers of potentially oppressive power, as in need of supervision and 
regulation by the state.”113 
So, if the fate of religious freedom is tied to that of the church, is decline 
inexorable?  Not necessarily.  In the first place, however lamentable the 
multiplicity of churches may seem from some theological standpoints, it is 
not necessarily a disability for the purpose of upholding religious freedom.  
A plurality of faiths makes religious freedom more necessary.114  And 
scholars employing an economic analysis argue that religion, and churches, 
are actually stronger when there is competition in a sort of religious 
marketplace.115 
Moreover, despite the obvious multitude of churches, in some contexts 
the practice of referring to “the church,” in the singular, persists.  Nor is that 
practice merely an anachronistic holdover; it captures something crucial in 
(many) Christians’ self-understanding.  Under the familiar view in which 
“the church” refers in part and perhaps most centrally to something like “the 
invisible church” and the various observable “churches” are understood to 
 
 111.  For discussion, see Laycock, supra note 6, at 419–22. 
 112.  Id. at 420.  
 113.  RICHARD W. GARNETT, “THINGS THAT ARE NOT CAESAR’S”: THE STORY OF KEDROFF V. 
ST. NICHOLAS CATHEDRAL, IN FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew 
Koppelman eds., 2011).  Cf. VELI-MATTI KARKKAINEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO ECCLESIOLOGY 7 
(2002) (observing that “the term church for better or worse reasons has been loaded with so many 
unfortunate connotations from authoritarianism to coercion to antiquarianism”).  
 114.  Cf. JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, CHURCHES IN THE MODERN STATE 101 (1913) (“It was the 
competing claims of religious bodies, and the inability of any single one to destroy the others, which 
finally secured liberty.”). 
 115.  See RODNEY STARK & ROGER FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH: EXPLAINING THE HUMAN SIDE OF 
RELIGION (2000). 
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be instantiations or manifestations of that more mystical entity,116 it is still 
meaningful to refer to “the church,” in the singular.  Theologians have 
developed sophisticated ecclesiologies that emphasize the underlying or 
immanent unity in the midst of the conspicuous plurality.117  In this vein, 
theological ethicist Gilbert Meilander writes: 
For my part, I believe that the Church’s genuine oneness need not 
be translated into institutional unity.  If this commits me to 
believing that the one holy catholic and apostolic church is 
“invisible,” that’s alright.  Invisibility in this sense is not a way of 
escaping from time, place, and embodiment.  On the contrary, it is a 
way of taking time, place, and embodiment seriously, a way of 
recognizing the multiform manner in which the one Church—under, 
surely, the governance of the Holy Spirit—has taken shape in 
human history.118 
With respect to other negative indicators, it is good to recall that history 
usually doesn’t unfold in linear ways.  So if you take current trends and 
project very far forward, you’ll nearly always be wrong.  This is true in 
particular of the church (and, more generally, of religion).  Who would have 
predicted in the year 100, or 200, or even 300 or 310 (in the midst of the 
Diocletianic persecution), that Christianity would become the official 
religion of the Empire?  Who would have predicted the eleventh century 
papal revolution, with its campaign to liberate and purify the church, from 
the midst of the scandalous “dark century” that preceded it?  In 1787, who 
could have foreseen the flourishing of faiths and churches in new American 
forms that would unfold in the nineteenth century?  Through the nineteenth 
century and the first half of the twentieth, nearly all social scientists and 
prognosticators foresaw the inexorable decline of religion as modernization 
took hold.119  Writing in 1968, the sociologist Peter Berger expressed a 
 
 116.  See, e.g., KARKKAINEN, supra note 113, at 51–53, 168–69.  Cf. BRIGHAM YOUNG, 
DISCOURSES OF BRIGHAM YOUNG 441 (John A. Widtsoe ed., 1976) (“When this Kingdom is 
organized in any age, the Spirit of it dwells in the hearts of the faithful, while the visible department 
exists among the people, with laws, ordinances, helps, governments, officers, administrators, and 
every other appendage necessary for its complete operation to the attainment of the end in view.”). 
 117.  See, e.g., 3 ROGER HAIGHT, ECCLESIAL EXISTENCE (2008). 
 118.  Gilbert Meilander, The Catholic I Am, First Things, Feb. 2011, 27, 28.  For reservations 
about this position, see HENRI DE LUBAC, THE SPLENDOR OF THE CHURCH 84–102 (Michael Mason 
trans., 1953). 
 119.  José Casanova explains: 
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common view in predicting that “[b]y the 21st century, religious believers are 
likely to be found only in small sects, huddled together to resist a world-side 
secular culture.”120  So much for predictions based on present trajectories or 
indicators. 
One other observation seems necessary.  At least in the view of 
believers, the church is not a merely human institution, and its fortunes will 
not be determined merely by human agency.  Jacques Maritain explained 
that the church is, in the Christian view, “a supernatural mystery.” 
[T]he Church is not only a visible and apparent reality but also an 
object of faith, not a system of administrative cog-wheels but the 
Body of Christ whose living unity, incomparably more elevated and 
strong than in this world we describe as moral personality, is 
guaranteed by the action of the Holy Ghost.121 
Maritain conceded that this idea would “scandalise unbelievers,” and 
that “it would even be absurd for those who do not and those who do know 
what the Church is to form the same idea of what her rights are.”122  He was 
surely right about that much.  Nonbelievers will likely find a hope for the 
church based on the “guarantee” of the Holy Ghost absurd, and quite likely 
unintelligible.  They will think the believers are deluded.  If that is so, then 
the church might well be destined to decline—and religious freedom, 
perhaps, along with it.  We may be living in the last chapter of the story of 
American (and Western, and indeed global) religious freedom. 
But then if the believers are deluded, ultimately, does the story really 
matter much anyway? 
  
 
In one form or another, with the possible exception of Alexis de Tocqueville, Vilfredo 
Pareto, and William James, the thesis of secularization was shared by all the founding 
fathers: from Karl Marx to John Stuart Mill, from Auguste Comte to Herbert Spencer, 
from E.B. Tylor to James Frazer, from Ferdinand Toennies to Georg Simmel, from Emile 
Durkheim to Max Weber, from Wilhelm Wundt to Sigmund Freud, from Lester Ward to 
William G. Sumner, from Robert Park to George H. Mead.  Indeed, the consensus was 
such that not only did the theory remain uncontested but apparently it was not even 
necessary to test it, since everybody took it for granted. 
JOSÉ CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGION IN THE MODERN WORLD 17 (1994). 
 120.  Peter Berger, A Bleak Outlook Is Seen for Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1968, 3. 
 121.  JACQUES MARITAIN, THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT CAESAR’S 31 (J.F. Scanlan trans., 1930). 
 122.  Id. at 24. 
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*** 
